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THE ADAMSON CASE:
A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL TECHNIQUE
"To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them. .. ."
-Alexander Hamilton
" constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some
chances ......
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.2
An institution which settles general propositions by concrete cases must
be peculiarly sensitive to the interrelations of function and technique. The
Supreme Court, in reaching decisions, has open to it not only a choice of
ends but also a variety of means. When the Court has occasion to probe
deeply into the related problems of judicial function and constitutional
1. THE FEDERALIST, No. 78.
2. Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911).
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technique, the result may be a landmark case. Such was Adamson v. Cali-
fornia.3
The specific problem of judicial function there debated is one which has
only recently come to the fore-the extent and character of Supreme Court
supervision of state criminal procedure. The problem of technique is an
older one--the choice of methods involved in using the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment4 to restrict state action.
The case speaks for itself in highlighting the conflict. Adamson was tried
for murder and was subjected, under California constitutional and statutory
mandates, to extensive comment by the prosecutor on his failure to take the
witness stand in his own behalf. He appealed the resulting comiction on
the ground that the state constitution and statute abridged his federal con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment and made binding on the states by the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth. This he buttressed by the additional contention
that the privilege against self-incrimination inheres in the right to a fair
trial, protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
His conviction was affirmed by a sharply divided Court.' Justice Reed,
speaking for the majority of five,7 had no difficulty in disposing of the case
on precedent. The claim had often been made, and always decisively re-
jected, that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the limitations of the Bill of
Rights binding on the states." The forlorn history of the privileges and
immunities clause 9 testified to the Court's reluctance thus categorically to
3. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
4. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoxsT. AmEND. XIV, § 1.
References herein to "the Fourteenth Amendment" or to "the Amendment" are to the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment as set forth above.
5. ". .. in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to
explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against himn may be
commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the
jury." CAI, CoNsr. Art. I, §13.
"The failure of the defendant to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or
facts in the case against him may be commented upon by counsel." CALIF. PaZAxL CODE
§ 13Z3.
6. That an acute divergence of opinion on the use of the Fourteenth Amendment
existed on the Court was presaged by Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinions in
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412 (1945) and Louisiana ex Mcl. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947).
7. Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Burton, Frankfurter, Jackson and Reed.
S. E.9., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900); Tvdning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908) ; Palkov. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
9. Ever since the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873), where it was de-
cided that only the privileges of national citizenship are protected against state action by
19491
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limit the states. And the due process clause, potent weapon though it was
against state economic regulation, proved no categorical reference to Bill of
Rights limitations."0 Further, Justice Reed found, the very problem of self-
incrimination had been considered by the Court forty years previously in
Twining v. New Jersey," where the claim that the states are barred from
abridging the privilege against self-incrimination was rejected. 2 Stare
decisis gave a short answer to the problem before the Court.
But the minority was not impressed by short answers. Four justices," led
by Mr. Justice Black, thought that the entire judicial history of the Four-
teenth Amendment had been a mistake.' 4 The Court, they said, must apply
the Bill of Rights in toto against the states. But the dissenters disagreed
among themselves as to the limits of the Amendment. Justices Murphy and
Rutledge, while agreeing with Justice Black as to the incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, did not agree that the first eight amendments necessarily
comprehend all the protection afforded against state action by the Four-
teenth Amendment." The Rutledge-Murphy view is not new to the Court,
thanks to a lonely but manful Thirty Year's War carried on by Justice
Harlan,"6 and to a traditional minority view of the meaning of the Fourteenth
See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884), Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.
Literally hundreds of claims of privilege based on national citizenship have been rejected
by the Court. Wherever the argument has been used to encompass Bill of Rights guar-
antees, it has been unsuccessful. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (jury trial i
suit at common law); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (12-man jury in criminal
trial) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (privilege against self-incrimination)
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy).
Only a few scattered rights of a national character, such as the right to vote for
members of Congress, to petition Congress, to resort to federal courts, are considered
embodied in the privileges and immunities clause; it has become in effect a last resort
for hopeless constitutional claims. See Note, 9 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 106, 113 (1940).
The one departure in recent years was speedily rectified. Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U.S. 404 (1935) (right to engage in business outside state of residence held privilege of
national citizenship), overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). For sub-
sequent attempts to revive the privileges and immunities clause, see note 19 infra,
10. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (indictment by grand jury). The
Twining and Palko cases, supra note 9, also considered and rejected the due process ar-
gument.
11. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
12. As in the Adamson case, the Court in the Twining case had before it claims
based both on privileges and immunities and due process. The privileges and immuni-
ties argument, by 1908, was easily disposed of by reference to an unbroken string of de-
cisions going back to the Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 9. A more elaborate dis-
cussion was accorded the due process argument, which was rejected on the grounds that
in England and in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, due process
had not embraced the privilege against self-incrimination. 211 U.S. 78, 100 et seq.
13. Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge.
14. 332 U.S. 46, 68.
15. Id. at 123.
16. Alone of the members of his Court, Justice Harlan dissented consistently from
the proposition that the Bill of Rights is not included in the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Vol. 58: 268
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Amendment set out in impressive detail in Justice Black's historical ap-
pendix. 17
But the minority's position, as enunciated by Justice Black, embodies a
more startling thesis, which has no purely historic justification. It seeks to
limit the scope of the Amendment to the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.Y3 So interpreted, no one clause of the Amendment imports the Bill
of Rights and, indeed, none of the separate clauses can have any independ-
ent meaning, for the section must be read as a whole to bring the Bill of
Rights-and nothing more-to bear upon the states. 1
Why does Justice Black seek to limit the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Bill of Rights guarantees rather than merely to include those guarantees? A
double answer must be essayed to this question, in terms of his view of the
function of the Supreme Court in relation to the states and his view of the
proper technique of constitutional adjudication.
As to function, he believes in general that the Court should refrain from
See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (184), Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.
581, 605 (1900), Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908). See further CLArm,
THz CONSMTioNMA. Docraixas OF JusTICE HAmu.A 59-82, 173-6 (1915).
17. 332 U.S. 46, 92.
18. That limitation rather than mere inclusion is Justice Black's objective is made
clear by Justice Murphy's separate dissent. "I agree [with Justice Black] that the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But I am not prepared to say that the latter is entirely and
necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so
far short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant constitu-
tional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the absence of a specific pro-
vision in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 124.
Justice Black's limitation thesis is implicit in his attack on the due process formula.
.to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution is one thing; to in-
validate statutes because of application of 'natural law' deemed to be above and unde-
fined by the Constitution is another." Id. at 91.
19. Justice Black is forced therefore to retreat from his recent sponsorship of the
privileges and immunities clause as guarantor of civil rights. See Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). A by-product of abandon-
ment of express reliance on the privileges and immunities clause is broader coverage,
since it speaks of "citizens" and would therefore exclude aliens from the enjoyment of
personal liberty under the Court's protection.
Since the entire history of attempts to include the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment has been marked by the separate use of either due process or privileges and
immunities, Justice Black is compelled to pay deference to arguments for inclusion which
use these clauses separately. The result is an ambiguity as to precisely what it is in the
Fourteenth Amendment that imports the Bill of Rights. "... . one of the chief objects
that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whllc, were
intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.' [Em-
phasis added] 332 U.S. 46, 71.
Where this leaves the separate clauses, and particularly the equal protection clause,
is difficult to ascertain.
For a recent attack on imprecision in the labelling of constitutional authority, see
Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 290 (1941).
1949]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
interfering with state economic regulation,20 but that it should intervene to
protect personal liberties from infringement by the state.21 As to constitu-
tional technique, Justice Black expresses himself vigorously in favor of a
close and literal application of precise constitutional provisions. His ideal
is adherence to the meaning of the Constitution and certainty in its applica-
tion. He disapproves of the use of vague formulae to permit increments of
judicial power.22
Whether the function or the technique counts more heavily is difficult to
say, since in his exposition they dovetail so well. Interference with state
economic regulation, he points out, has been effected under the aegis of the
conveniently broad due process technique.23 Personal liberties, on the other
hand, seem explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights.24 Therefore, Justice Black
sees limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights as per-
forming the double purpose of keeping the Court out of the economic area
and active in the personal liberty field. The technique, in his view, leads to
the desired function.
It was Justice Black's attack on the due process technique that drew the
fire of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion.2 5 Speaking completely in
terms of judicial history,2 Justice Frankfurter interposed a strong defense
of the due process formula. That formula, he indicates, has served to bring
into the law the prevailing notions of fundamental rights peculiar to an era.
It is for him an index of the constitutional Zeitgeist .2
20. E.g., ". . . the invalidation of regulatory laws by this Court's appraisal of 'cir-
cumstances' would [not] readily be classified as the most satisfactory contribution of
this Court to the nation." 332 U.S. 46, 83. See also Justice Black's dissent in Conn. Gen-
eral Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938).
21. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
22. ".... I further contend that the 'natural law' formula which the Court uses to
reach its conclusion in this case should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on
our Constitution. I believe that formula to be itself a violation of our Constitution, in
that it subtly conveys to courts, at the expense of legislatures, ultimate power over pub-
lic policies in fields where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative
power." 332 U.S. 46, 75.
23. Id. at 79 et seq. See cases collected id. at 83 n. 12.
24. Id. at 70.
25. Id. at 59.
26. The opinions of Justices Black and Frankfurter in this case provide an interesting
contrast on the rhetorical level. Justice Frankfurter stresses judicial history and minil-
mizes the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black concentrates
on the intent and dismisses as a "mistake" the subsequent judicial interpretation of the
Amendment. Both manage to buttress their approaches with citation to equally respec-
table canons of constitutional construction. Compare 332 U.S. 46, 63 (Constitution must
be read in light of plain meaning of the language) zith 332 U.S. 46, 72 (Constitution
must be read through eyes of its framers).
27. The formula's appellation, of course, is drawn from the wording of the Four-
teenth Amendment's first section. Thus, for example, in its employment, specific refer-
ence may be either to "due process" or "equal protection." But whichever is used, the
criterion is "fundamental notions of justice" rather than specific constitutional provisions.
It is this approach, rather than the due process clause itself, which is referred to herein as
the "due process technique."
[Vol. 58: 268
THE ADAMSON CASE
Since Justice Frankfurter does not essay a definition of the Court's func-
tion in state cases, the conflict-Bill of Rights against due process, certainty
against flexibility-takes place on the level of technique. Assuming, then,
Justice Black's concept of the Court's function,2s what are the historical and
logical bases of his proposed technique? Would that technique promote the
achievement of the desired function? And, finally, should Justice Black's
Bill of Rights technique be found to have disadvantages, does the poor
performance of the due process technique nonetheless require the adoption
of Justice Black's technique-with its explicit use of Bill of Rights guaran-
tees-to protect such vital personal liberties as the right to a fair trial?
TowARDS A MORE STATIC JURISPRUDENCE: TaiM BLACK VIEW
The Rhetoric of History. Justice Black's opinion is marked by the deference
which he pays to the "intent of the founders." And by far the most imme-
diately impressive feature of his contribution is the elaborate historical
appendix which documents the "intent" argument.0 Although the gist of
his position-the limitation thesis-exists independently of the historical
disquisition, z' Justice Black's excurison into the past is so basic to the fabric
of his argument that it requires some independent analysis.
His historical position may be summarized as follows. In interpreting the
Constitution we should follow intent. There is an intent behind the Four-
teenth Amendment. That intent can be ascertained by turning to the words
of the man responsible for its form. That man is Congressman John Bingham
of Ohio.3 ' Congressman Bingham intended that the Bill of Rights be made
binding on the states.
Starting at the latter end of this proof, there is ample support for Justice
Black's view. The minutes of the Committee on Reconstruction and the
debates on the floor as reported in the Congressional Globe make it clear
that Bingham did intend to incorporate the Bill of Rights.32 Justice Black
28. Assuming, but not deciding. An inquiry into the nature of the Supreme Court's
function is not within the scope of this discussion.
Perhaps the major problem inherent in what appears to be Justice Black's concep-
tion of the Court's function in state cases is the conflict that frequently arises between
state regulatory legislation and what we have come to regard as civil liberties. Sce
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 153 (1944) (application of child labor statute to pre-
vent minor from distributing Jehovah's Witness literature) ; Kotch v. Board of Commis-
sioners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (use of statute regulating pilotage training to eNercise nepo-
tic control over entrance to profession).
For recent discussion of the Court's function, see Rostow, Book Review, 56 YLa
L.J. 1469 (1947); Comment, The Image in the Mirror, 56 YAMX L.J. 1356 (1947).
29. The appendix provides an exhaustive documentation of the debates in the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction and on the floor of both Houses.
30. No hint of the limitation thesis appears in any of the historical materials available.
31. Justice Black refers to Bingham as "the Madison of the first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment' 332 U.S. 46, 74.
32. See, especially, Bingham's speech of February 28, 1S65, CoNs. Gtoui, 39th Cong.,
1949]
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cites well and fully to this point. But what is not revealed in those minutes
and debates so painstakingly collated by Justice Black is the fact that other
purposes motivated John Bingham.
We are not told, for example, that Bingham belonged to the irreconcilable
group of "Black Republicans" who sought to crush the defeated South by
enhancing national power at the expense of the states.3 We also fail to
learn from Justice Black's historical data that Bingham, like all good
abolitionists, viewed the Supreme Court with suspicion and dislike,"1 and
that he regarded the Amendment as a weapon for legislative rather than
judicial action against the states." And we get no hint of Bingham's position
as a railroad lawyer and a strong proponent of economic laissez-faire, which
might have made him sympathetic to the very view of due process which is
anathema to Justice Black. 8 And there is nothing in what Bingham or
anyone else said to suggest that the Amendment was to be exclusively a
shorthand reference to the Bill of Rights.
It would seem, then, that the intent which Justice Black imputes to Bing-
ham is only one thread in a tangled skein. But even conceding a limited
validity to his interpretation, how much does it prove? A constitutional
amendment is the end product of the acquiescence of Congress and the states.
Equating the intent of one man with so communal a project seems an over-
simplification.
And finally, there comes into question the validity of the postulate under-
1st Sess. (1866) 1089 et seq. See also speech of Senator Howard, May 23, 1866, id. at
2764 et seq.
33 See Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALt
L.J. 371, 392 (1938). The atmosphere in which discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment
were carried on partook more of a desire to wreak vengeance on the iniquitous South than
to promote person liberty. Only a year after the Amendment was framed, President An-
drew Johnson faced impeachment, as much as for anything, for his lenient attitude toward
the South.
34. See Bingham's speech of April 24, 1860, CoNG. GLOB;, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1839
(1860). See also 3 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTOav 171, 189
(1922).
35. See FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 136-9 (1908).
36. The famous conspiracy theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, if accurate, would
place on Bingham and Roscoe Conkling the onus of having deliberately worded the Four-
teenth Amendment to give judicial protection to corporate property rights as against state
regulation. See 2 BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERIcA CIvIIuzATIoN 111-13 (1928). That
theory has been rejected by the most careful study made to date. Graham, The "Conspiracy
Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938), 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938).
But even if there was no deliberate attempt to write freedom from state economic regu-
lation into the Amendment, a study of Bingham's views on natural rights and the sanctity
of property discloses that such a concept of due process is in line with his own beliefs,
Graham, supra, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 393-402. Bingham undoubtedly wished to include the Bill
of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment. This does not mean that he would have been hos-
tile to the use of due process to limit state economic regulation. ". . . the Civil War of it-
self consummated a marriage of idealistic and economic elements in American constitutional
theory." [Italics in original.] Graham, supra, 48 YALE L.J. 171, 194 (1938).
[Vol. 58: 268
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lying the argument from intent. The original purpose of the Amendment,
to the extent that it can be ascertained, may be an important part of its
historical meaning. But it can never be the decisive element in the growth
of the Constitution as a living organism. Three-quarters of a century of
doctrinal development cannot be shrugged off as mere historical error. It is
suggested that resort to the intent of the Fathers is an escape from rather
than a solution to the problem. If Justice Black's position deserves adoption,
it must be on more substantial grounds than the dubious rhetoric of history.
The Logic of Certainty. Pervading the pages of his dissent is Justice Black's
distrust of the vagueness and uncertainty of the due process formula. He is
haunted by the specter of due process as a clog on state economic legisla-
tion.Y7 His concern is to prevent a return to that charismatic jurisprudence
which enabled the Court to substitute its views on economic policy for those
of the legislature. As one means toward that end, he has in the past ad-
vanced the view that corporations are not persons within the meaning of the
due process clause.? That view never won acceptance by the Court. But
the limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights represents
another line of attack on the same problem. It is a technique more sophisti-
cated than an attempt to separate corporations from natural persons, easily
circumvented by the device of the stockholder suit. The law still regards
the stockholder as a person. °
But is the freedom of the state to regulate business enterprise assured by
limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights? The Amend-
ment, powerful judicial weapon through it is, does not exhaust the Constitu-
tion's potentiality. There are other clauses which could operate at least as
effectively as a restraint on state economic regulation." The recent history
of the Commerce Clause testifies to that fact.4" A court eager to impose its
37. See note 22 supra.
38. "But this formula [due process] has been used in the past and can be used in the
future, to license this Court, in considering regulatory legislation, to roam at large in the
broad expanses of policy and morals and to trespass, all too freely, on the legislative do-
main of the States as well as the Federal Government." 332 U.S. 46, 90.
Justice Black, earlier in dissent, calls the roll of due process cases which "trespass, all
too freely." Id. at 83, n. 12. As he himself points out, many of these decisions have since
been overruled by a Court with a much reduced propensity "to roam at large." See infra, p.
279.
39. See his dissent in Conn. General Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 33 (1933).
40. See Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amcndment, 16 N.Y.U.LQ.
Ruv. 19, 66, n. 32 (1938).
41. A Court eager to interfere with state economic policy, but barred from the use of
the Fourteenth Amendment would still have a wide choice of constitutional weapons. See,
e.g., the Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, Ci. 3; the Contract Clause, id. Art. I,
§ 10, CL 1; the Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. Art. IN, § 2, CI. 1; the Supremacy
Clause, id. Art. VI, Cl. 2.
42. In the field of taxation of interstate enterprises, the Commerce Clause has far out-
stripped the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for invalidating state economic legis-
lation. Compare Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942) and International Har-
19491
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notions of policy on the states will not be thwarted by the frail shield of
verbal limitation; state economic regulation is safe from judicial inter-
vention only so long as it pleases the Court to hold it so.
Even if Justice Black's interpretation fails to protect state economic
regulation from the Court's scrutiny, it retains an attractive quality. It is
true that other constitutional provisions remain as vast reservoirs of judicial
power over the states.43 But adopting his position, would the Fourteenth
Amendment then be completely circumscribed and defined? Could limi-
tation to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights pin the Amendment
down to a precise and certain meaning?
Unfortunately, the judicial history of the first eight amendments does not
indicate that its guarantees are particularly specific. Nuances of interpreta-
tion have emerged which do not derive from a literal reading. The words of
the First Amendment do not lead inevitably to the conclusion that freedom
of speech means freedom to carry on peaceful picketing,4 4 or that the free
exercise of religion means license to distribute leaflets and ring doorbells. 4"
Nor, to cite a most recent example, does it necessarily follow that "public
rides to private schools" .are permissible while the use of released time for
religious education in public schools is interdicted by the separation of
church and state.46
The greater the sweep of the Court's protection of personal liberties, tile
greater has been the departure from literal adherence to verbal formulae. 4
And consequently, the less "certainty" is achieved. 48
And even if most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were to lend them-
selves to simple and certain construction, there remains an exception. For
the Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth, contains a due process clause.4
vester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947) (Fourteenth Amendment-tax upheld) vith Free-
man v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) and Joseph v. Carter & Weekes, 330 U.S. 422 (1947)
(Commerce Clause-tax stricken down).
The Commerce Clause has become much more vigorous than it seemed as recently as
six years ago, See Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, 10 U. or Cmr. L. Rv. 27, 48
(1942).
43. See note 41 supra.
44. But see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Compare Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
45. But see Lovell v. Griffin 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) ; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943). Compare Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943).
46. Compare Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) with MeCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). See Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1114 (1948).
47. For a criticism of this departure, which seems somewhat out of keeping with his
own favorable attitude toward the fluidity of due process, see Justice Frankfurter, dissent-
ing, in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941).
48. Justice Black is not, of course, contending for absolute certainty in the application
of the Constitution, 332 U.S. 46, 90. But the distinction which he draws (id. at 91) be-
tween "particular standards" and "natural law" lapses into logomachy when the Court con-
siders situations far beyond the ambit of the "intent of the founders."
49. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. V.
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And their respective histories indicate that in a given climate of opinion
their scope is coterminous.19 The Fifth Amendment is equally as capable as
the Fourteenth of contraction and expansion to suit changing views of
judicial policy. 51 It would appear that the existence of so elastic a pro-
vision in the Bill of Rights is conclusively fatal to the theory that limitation
to it would bring about a new certainty and predictability in the application
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even if Justice Black's proposal does not succeed in lImiting the Four-
teenth Amendment, may it not provide a desirable certainty by standardiz-
ing Supreme Court protection of personal liberties? At first glance, whole-
sale application of the Bill of Rights guarantees against state action emerges
in perhaps its most appealing guise in the immediate context of the Adamson
case, the problem of protecting individuals on trial. But on closer inspection,
some of the restrictions on state procedure entailed in blanket inclusion of
the Bill of Rights seem overly rigid.A2
In many states, the accused is informed of the nature of the charge against
him by information or indictment by one-man grand jury, procedures which
deviate from the common law indictment by grand jury embodied in the
Fifth Amendment. In many states the procedural absolute of the twelve-
man petit jury in criminal cases has been modified. And in many states,
a jury in all suits at common law involving more than twenty dollars (a
somewhat more significant sum in 1789 than today) has not seemed a neces-
sary concomitant of justice. Yet the rigidity of these procedures would,
under the Black theory, be binding on the states, and would presumably
be enforced against them by the Court. 3
50. Compare Adair v. United States, 203 U.S. 161 (190S) ith Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidation of anti-"yellow dog" contract statutes); cowtnarc Adlins
v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) Uith Morehead v. New York ex rc. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidation of minimum wage statutes).
It is worthy of note that 'West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (due
process-Fourteenth Amendment) overruled the Adl:ins decision (due procss-Fifth
Amendment).
51. "It ought not to require argument to reject the notion that due process of law
meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth" Frankfurter, J.,
in 332 U.S. 46, 66.
This difficulty on the purely verbal level is not met by Justice Black in his dissent, un-
less implicit in his position is the assertion that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
did intend its due process clause to mean something different from that of the Fifth.
52. For a discussion of the Adamson case in terms of the difficulties involved in impos-
ing federal procedure on the states, see Note, 96 U. oF PA. L. PEv. 272 (1947).
53. Justice Frankfurter accuses the minority of hedging on this point. He states that
Justice Black advocates a "subjective selection" of Bill of Rights guarantees for inclusion
in the Fourteenth Amendment, implying that even Justice Black would ball: at enforcing
the restrictive procedural provisions. 332 U.S. 46, 64-5.
A surface plausibility is lent this contention by an ambiguous sentence in Justice Black's
opinion. "Whether this Court ever will, or whether it now should, in the light of past de-
cisions, give full effect to what the Amendment was intended to accomplish is not neces-
sarily essential to a decision here." Id. at 75.
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Limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights includes
too much; it also fails to include enough. For example, the present sanction
for the ban on racial discrimination in jury selection, the equal protection
clause, does not appear in the first eight amendments.54 If the limitation
dogma were consistently applied, the Court might find itself unable to cope
with the rise of new procedural abuses."
Prognosis Negative. Analysis of the Black position seems to reveal grave
defects. Its reliance on appeal to a somewhat ambiguous intent of the
framers is a regression to a less realistic school of constitutional rhetoric. Its
attempt to confine the ambient play of judicial power to a chartered course
is nugatory. Its mechanistic application of a series of unrelated limitations
to the states is restrictive and burdensome.
It appears, then, that the technique advanced by Justice Black falls far
short of realizing the judicial function for which it is designed. No formula
can of itself keep the Court out of the economic area and active in protecting
personal liberties.M Admittedly, the Bill of Rights technique serves ade-
quately to protect rights expressly enumerated in the first eight amend-
ments. But, while the characteristic inflexibility of Justice Black's technique
might be on occasion relaxed to permit the Court to cope with new inroads
on personal liberty, his technique still has the disadvantage of imposing
restrictive procedures on state criminal administration.
The only remaining issue is whether the due process technique so abjectly
fails to protect personal liberties that-practically by default-Justice
Black's technique must be adopted. That the Adamson case poses the prob-
Whatever this sentence may mean, it clearly does not mean that Justice Black is reced-
ing from his absolutist position on wholesale inclusion of the Bill of Rights. "If the choice
must be between the selective process of the Palko decision applying some of the Bill of
Rights to the States, or the Twining rule, applying none of them, I would chose the Palko
selective process. But rather than accept either of these choices, I would follow what I be-
lieve was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the people
of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights. To hold that this Court can de-
termine what, if any, provision of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what de-
gree, is to frustrate the great design of a written Constitution." Id. at 89.
A more unequivocal statement could hardly be imagined of the thesis that the Bill of
Rights in all its rigor should be applied against the states. Yet Justice Frankfurter chooses
to brand the Black position as "subjective selection" and has apparently won approval for
his view. See Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Long, 57 YALu L.J.
571, 590 (1948) ; Harris, Due Process of Law, in Symposium, Ten Years of the Supreme
Court: 1937-1947, 42 Am. PoL ScI. Rav. 32, 41 (1948).
54. See infra, p. 283. The same result might be achieved by the Sixth Amendment's
reference to an "impartial" jury.
55. Justice Black seems confident that the Bill of Rights offers adequate protection
against new threats to freedom. He admits, however, that the "basic purposes" of the Bill
of Rights must be kept in mind if it is to constitute an effective safeguard. This would
seem to have more to do with the Court's desire to maintain personal freedom than with
the words of the Bill of Rights.
56. Always assuming that as the function for which a suitable technique is being
sought. See note 28 supra.
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lem in the context of state criminal procedure suggests examination of this
field to determine whether the traditional due process technique is being
utilized to maintain a democratic balance between private freedom and
public order.
ORDERED LIBERTY AND TiE FAiR TRIAL: DuE PRocEss ILLUSTRATED
The Great Shift. A constitutional revolution has transformed the Four-
teenth Amendment from the bastion of economic laissez-faire to the bulwark
of personal freedom. 7 A survey of Fourteenth Amendment cases from 1932
down to the present shows a progressive diminution of decisions striking
down state economic and social regulation. The same period shows a tre-
mendous growth in the invocation and application of the Amendment as a
shield for personal liberty.53
The most spectacular area of that growth has been in the substantive
guarantees of the First Amendment, which have been utilized in the Four-
teenth with ever-increasing consistency and effectiveness to give meaning
to the word "liberty." 51 But there has been an equally broad and revolu-
57. For the classic discussion of the constitutional theory underlying the shift, see
Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 YAM Lj. 1319
(1941). A recent discussion of milestone cases on the road to the "new" due process is
Harris, supra note 53.
58. The folloving tabular presentation highlights the radical nature of the shift.
Claims of restriction
of of
economic freedom personal liberties
Term of Total Claims Total Clahns
Court Claims Upheld Ciahs Upheld
1932-33 21 3 2 1
1933-34 24 6 2 1
1934-35 23 8 7 4
1935-36 18 6 2 2
1936-37 16 5 2 2
1937-38 12 1 5 2
1938-39 15 0 4 4
1939-40 14 0 10 7
1940-41 8 0 10 5
1941-42 3 0 15 6
1942-43 2 0 9 8
1943-44 4 0 5 2
1944-45 4 0 10 6
1945-46 7 0 7 4
1946-47 2 0 11 2
1947-48 1 0 21 15
59. Verbally, this has been accomplished by incorporating the guarantees of the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (press) ;
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (peaceful picketing) ; West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (religion).
19491
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tionary development in the field of procedural protection in criminal trials,
the context of the Adamson case.60
That due process guarantees a fair trial is an old constitutional cliche.'"
But until the last fifteen years, no attempt had been made to give the phrase
meaning. Scattered procedural guarantees, most of them very obvious, were
mentioned, 2 but there was no effort to find a rationale that would set a
pattern of Supreme Court action.
Today however, problems of state criminal procedure evoke the great
majority of decisions under the aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment.03 But
the Court has been selective in its choice of restrictions to include in the
Amendment. The criterion is an elastic one. As it emerged from the alembic
of Mr. Justice Cardozo's prose, it is those guarantees "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty." 64 These the states may not abridge. The impart-
ing of substance to Justice Cardozo's phrase has been the recent history of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Tainted Evidence. The most widely known of the new restrictions on the
states is the ban on coerced confessions. The use of violence to extort a con-
fession from the prisoner vitiates the effect of the confession, and of a con-
viction obtained by its introduction in evidence." The concept "violence"
was at first limited to physical torture. But soon the prohibition was ex-
tended to subtler forms of intimidation,66 as the Court recognized that the
36-hour grilling session 67 is as coercive as the truncheon or rubber hose. As
applied to the states, the essence of the fault is that the methods employed
must have made it impossible for the confession to be the prisoner's free and
voluntary statement.68
This differs from the federal rule, which excludes a confession obtained
60. For an excellent detailed discussion of the cases, see Boskey and Pickering, Federal
Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. OF CmS. L. Rxv. 266 (1946). For a bird's-
eye view, see Harris, supra note 53, at 39-42.
61. See MorT, DuE PRocEss OF LAw 208 et seq. (1926).
62. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trial invalidated) ; Tunicy
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (fee system making judge's pay contingent on finding defend-
ant guilty nullified) ; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (statutory presumption of guilt
held unconstitutional). ,
63. At the 1947-48 term of Court, thirteen cases involved state criminal procedure, See
note 107 infra.
64. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
65. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
66. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (protracted questioning without oppor-
tunity to consult friends or counsel).
67. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
68. In addition to cases cited notes 65-67 vipra, see per curiam decisions in Canty v.
Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941).
The rule has been reinforced by the recent case of Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
There the Court reversed the murder conviction of a 15-year old boy who, a majority of
five felt, had been handled by the police in such a maner as to make his confession the
product of fear rather than frankness.
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through illegal police methods, such as protracted detention incommu-
nicado.0 The mere fact that the police violated a state statute Vill not lead
the Supreme Court to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment unless it appears
that as a result the prisoner's confession was not free. The two rules have a
different thrust. The federal rule seeks to inhibit illegal police methods.
The state rule is aimed at protecting the individual from coercion."
Although the Court has not employed the distinction, a line may be drawn
between the federal and state rules on the basis of the probative value of the
evidence obtained. If the circumstances under which a confession is ob-
tained make it impossible that it should have been voluntary, its value as
evidence is thereby diminished, and it should be excluded, because a con-
viction based on unsatisfactory evidence clashes with the "fair trial" con-
cept of due process 7 If, however, the police methods were illegal but not
coercive, the probative value of the confession is not diminished, and its
exclusion as evidence constitutes discipline of the police rather than protec-
tion of the defendant.2
An analogous situation arises with respect to the federal rule of exclusion
of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure."3 That rule is
aimed at the police methods employed rather than at the protection of the
defendant.74 The evidence thereby excluded has not lost probative value.
This rule of exclusion has not been applied by the Court to the states, and
during the period under discussion, no state search and seizure cases have
come before the Court.7 5 If a case were to arise from a jurisdiction which
did not follow the federal rule of exclusion, the probative value rationale
would provide a plausible mode of disposing of the problem without up-
setting a substantial segment of state criminal procedure. Were the problem
to come before it, the Court would have the opportunity of deciding whether
protection against illegal searches and seizures is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."
Another sort of tainted evidence is that which is knowm to be perjured.
69. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Anderson v. United States, 318
U.S. 350 (1943). But see United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
70. Thus, where the police use illegal methods, but the confessions are "uncoerced," the
Court has held that no deprivation of due process results. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219 (1941). But where the illegal acts complained of amount to coercion, the confessions
so obtained will be excluded. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
The effect of a voluntary confession is not vitiated by the fact that a previous one was
coerced. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944). But cf. Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945).
71. 3 WXiG mo, EviDExcE § 822 (1940).
72. See cases cited note 69 supra.
73. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
74. See Comment, 58 YALE LJ. 144 (1948).
75. The lower court decision in Hague v. CIO, 101 F2d 774 (3rd Cir. 1939), held that
protection against illegal searches and seizures as against state officers was given by the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court de-
cision, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), did not discuss the point.
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Although the Court has never reversed a conviction on this ground, in con-
sidering Tom Mooney's habeas corpus petition it declared that a conviction
knowingly obtained through the use of perjured evidence would be re-
versed." Here, again, the probative value test should give an easy solution,
whether perjured evidence were used knowingly or unknowingly.
An Effective Hearing: The Right to Counsel. Perhaps the most important,
and the most controversial of the guarantees applied against the states is the
right to counsel. Since a hearing has long been considered an element of due
process, 7 it is surprising that the point was not made earlier that, in order
to be more than an empty form, a hearing must be had with the opportunity
of assistance by counsel.
The first Scottsboro case 78 embodied the guarantee, but limited the ruling
of the case to trials for capital offenses. Later, the Court applied it to a non-
capital case. 79 It seemed that the right to counsel was being universalized.
But in Betts v. Brady 80 the Court decided, over strong dissent,8 ' that the
right to counsel was not necessary in all state criminal trials, and that the
fairness of each proceeding had to be considered on its own merits. Follow-
ing Betts v. Brady the Court was fairly consistent in granting relief where the
right to counsel had not been preserved, 2 but again in the last two years a
cautionary note has crept in, and the Court has declined to intervene.8
At the last term of Court, the rule of Bells v. Brady was restated in Bule v.
Illinois.s4 The difficulties inherent in a case-by-case consideration of right
to counsel problems to which the Court was thus remitted were vividly illus-
trated by a pair of Pennsylvania cases decided later in the same term. Each
involved substantially the same situation: a deprivation of the right to
76. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
77. See Mont, loc. cit. supra note 61.
78. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
79. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (burglary).
80. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
81. Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy. Justice Black's dissent urged that the Sixth
Amendment should be equally applicable to the states as to the federal government.
82. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) (claim of deprivation of right to counsel held
good cause of action in habeas corpus proceeding under Fourteenth Amendment) ; Rice v.
Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (issue of right to counsel raised in habeas corpus petition un1-
der Fourteenth Amendment held not automatically waived by plea of guilty) ; Williams v,
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945) and Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S, 485 (1945) (convictions
vacated where failure to appoint counsel had forced guilty plea).
83. Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946) (insufficient showing of inadequacy of
appointed counsel) ; Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947) (collateral attack on de-
privation of counsel in first conviction held barred by failure to appeal second conviction,
sentence in which was based on existence of prior conviction). The Gayes case, together
with Foster, infra, was decided on the same day as Adamson.
Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) ; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947). The
stern attitude recently displayed toward the Illinois procedural labyrinth may impair the
validity of these decisions as authority on the right to counsel. See note 102 in Ira.
84. 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy. and Rutledge dissentIng).
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counsel aggravated by the trial court's misreading of state penal statutes.
A slight factual variation between the two allowed the Court to arrive at
diametric results.5
There seems little question that a happier solution-applicable alike to
due process and Bill of Rights techniques-would be to universalize the right
to counsel as a Fourteenth Amendment guarantee. The probative value test
suggests that without the services of counsel, irrelevant or prejudicial evi-
dence that could easily be excluded by the proper motion or objection may
come in freely and bring about a conviction. Further, it seems to violate all
notions of fairness to restrict the advantages of procedural technicalities
and the rewards of plea-bargaining to those defendants who can afford to
engage counsel.
The reluctance of the Court to establish a uniform right to counsel may
stem in part from hesitation to impose on the states the great administrative
burden that would necessarily be involved. To give meaning to the right to
aid of counsel, a comprehensive public defender system, available without
cost to all indigent defendants, would have to be established. Yet, until the
Court forces this move on the states, whether a man goes to jail may depend
on his financial ability to hire a lawyer.
An Impartial Jury. That Negroes may not be systematically excluded
from a jury which is trying a Negro is a rule so ingrained El that today the
Court disposes of discrimination cases by curt per curiam opinions. Al-
though the verbal vehicle here used is the equal protection clause, the
technique is that invoked in cases formally based on due process.n
But established as the rule against discrimination is, initiative is still with
the states. They do not have to make a very ardent effort in the direction of
impartiality to satisfy the Court that equal protection is being affordedp
Racial discrimination is a pretty obvious thing. But subtler forms of ex-
clusion seem to get by the Court; for it has not been willing to impose the
strict federal rule on the states. Federally, any selection which discrimi-
nates as to economic class sl or as to sex 01 is bad. But the Court has recently
rejected attacks on New York's "blue ribbon" jury system,95 even where
85. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (trial court imposed life sentence under mis-
apprehension that it was mandatory-conviction affirmed); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736 (1948) (trial court misread defendant's prior criminal record-conviction reversed).
86. First laid down in Strauder v. Vest Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1So).
87. See, e.g., Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 (1943). Other recent cases
where the Court gave a short answer to jury discrimination questions are Pattonv. Mfissis-
sippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) and Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948).
88. In Aldns v. Texas, 325 U.S. 393 (1945), the placing of one Negro on the grand
jury panel was deemed suficient to meet the charge of deprivation of equal protection.
89. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
90. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
91. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (labor leader tried by "blue ribbon" jury
which did not include members of the working class); Moore v. New Yorl, 333 U.S. 565
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racial discrimination was alleged. It would seem that equal protection
should have meaning North as well as South of the Mason-Dixon line?'2
Availability of Remedial Process. Underlying the entire discussion of
Supreme Court intervention in state criminal procedure is the premise that
the Court will hear charges of the deprivation of due process. Unless this is
true, restrictions laid on the states are empty verbalisms.
The Court has had to meet several contentions on the part of the states
which, if upheld, would greatly lessen the effectiveness of federal review. It
was at one time said that if the state statute under which the complained-of
procedure was carried on was itself constitutional, then the Court would
inquire no further. 3 That rule was the product of an era which had devel-
oped no clear notion of procedural due process. It has since been rejected
explicitly, 4 after being ignored in many prior decisions.
Another contention has been that the Supreme Court inquires only into
the !'law," and that determinations of "fact" in the state courts are final.
That particular ghost was exorcised over ten years ago,95 but it still occa-
sionally crops up as a rhetorical device invoked when the Court decides not
to reverse a particular conviction.
Another attempt to forestall Court review is the contention that "timely
objection" has not been made to the procedure questioned. That rule would
preclude the raising of the constitutional issue wherever it had not been
raised at the trial. The unfairness is apparent, especially when failure to
give the aid of counsel is the deprivation of due process alleged."° Fortu-
nately, the Court has decisively rejected this theory, and the validity of an
allegedly unconstitutional proceeding may be attacked on appeal or col-
laterally.
One large stumbling-block has remained intact until very recently. It is
an old rule, based on comity and convenience, that the Supreme Court will
not intervene until state remedies have been exhausted. But some state
procedures are virtually exhaustion-proof. In Illinois, a particularly flagrant
example, bemused petitioners may wander for years through a maze of con-
flicting procedures, without securing a hearing on the merits. More than
half of the petitions for certiorari filed in the Supreme Court during the last
(1948) (trial of Negro by "blue ribbon" jury which did not include a Negro upheld on au-
thority of Fay case).
92. Compare the Fay and Moore cases, note 91 supra with cases from Southern juris-
dictions, note 87 supra.
93. Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906).
94. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
95. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). See also Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940).
96. A particularly egregious example of undue deference to state court findings of fact
is Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). See note 88 supra.
97. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
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few years have come from prisoners in Illinois.0 3 Finally, last year, in
Marino v. Ragen, 1- at least three judges decided that even if state remedies
were not exhausted, their patience wras.11 Justice Rutledge penned a scath-
mng denunciation of "the Illinois merry-go-round" "I' and warned that in the
future, where state remedial processes are a bar rather than an aid to jus-
tice, the Court might lay aside the exhaustion rule and allow the federal
district courts to entertain habeas corpus petitions, regardless of the putative
existence of state remedies.
If the Court follows out this threat, the scope of its review may be greatly
broadened. And it will be questionable whether many of its recent decisions
will be reliable precedents. Particularly, some of the recent cases where the
right to counsel appeared to be narrowed may merely be the result of a
deference to state remedial processes which no longer exists.0 -
Summary. Today a person who has been railroaded to prison has a good
chance of obtaining federal relief. Fifteen years ago he had virtually none.
That is the great achievement of procedural due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Starting almost from scratch in 1932, the Court has built up
an impressive corpus of protection for individuals accused of crime.
That degree of protection is largely attributable to the flexibility of the due
process technique. A more rigid formula might well have fallen short of the
present achievement. And the Court will be provided with continued op-
portunities to revise and extend its system of minimal safeguards.
True, the Court has been more willing to rectify shocking injustices to
individuals than to eliminate general patterns of oppression. But the onus
98. total ntnnber numnbcrfrom





99. 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
100. Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge. It is a matter for conjecture why Justice
Black was not with this group.
101. Three different remedial avenues-coram nobis, writ of error, and habeas corpus-
are available, and their respective limitations are so poorly charted that in a given case, a
petitioner is almost certain to invoke the "wrong" one. See Justice Rutledge concurring in
Marino v. Regen, 332 U.S. 561, 569, n. 10 (1947).
A strong movement, sparked by scholars at the University of Chicago Law School, is
underway to force a modernization of the antiquated and cumbersome Illinois remedial ma-
chinery. See Katz, An Open Letter to the Attorney General of Illinois, 15 U. op CHI L
Rr-v. 251 (1948).
102. See the Carter and Foster cases cited note 83 supra. In both cases, the remedy in-
yoked was writ of error, which is based on the so-called common law record of the original
trial; facts sufficient to support an allegation of denial of counsel do not appear therein.
Both cases arose in Illinois and may be vitiated as precedent should the dissatisfaction with
Illinois procedure voiced by Justice Rutledge's concurrence in the Marino case represent
the Court's present attitude.
1949]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of heading in the latter direction is in any event on the states rather than the
Court. By use of the traditional due process technique, the Court can con-
tinue to set right the individual cases which come before it. And the doing of
justice in a few cases may point the way to a general increase of decency in
state criminal procedures. 0 3
CONCLUSION: ADAMSON RECONSIDERED
In the light of the recent development and present condition of the due
process technique, it seems fair to say that Justice Black's adherents in
Adamson were trying for too much. Their attempt was completely to
extirpate a constitutional technique which has proven itself capable of con-
structive change. The result for which they were striving-the broadening
of procedural gaurantees-is being achieved in a large measure through the
same gradual process of accretion which brought the freedoms of the First
Amendment under the protection of the Fourteenth.
On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter's concurrence exhibited a defer-
ence to stare decisis for its own sake which is not invulnerable to criticism. 1 4
His position was that self-incrimination is not essential to due process be-
cause Twining said so. That attitude would seem fatal to the flexibility
which is the due process formula's most valuable attribute.
The case proceeded on an unfortunate level of discourse because of the
minority's attempt to impose the entire Bill of Rights on the Court. It
might have been more fruitful to re-examine the privilege against self-
incrimination in the light of the "fair trial" concept, and to supplement the
historical discussion of the Twining case with a critical analysis of the
privilege.105
103. That this is by no means a vain hope is demonstrated by recent state cases it which
dubious procedures have been rejected for want of due process in terms which closely echo
current Supreme Court doctrine. Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406
(1948) (failure to appoint counsel for inexperienced boy in non-capital case, even where no
request for counsel was made, held violation of Fourteenth Amendment) ; Johnson v. State,
-Ind.--, 78 N.E.2d 158 (1948) (beating of 17-year old boy by police shortly before lie con-
fessed to commission of murder vitiates confession; intimation that result follows Supreme
Court mandate despite prior contrary decisions by state court).
104. "After enjoying unquestioned prestige for forty years, the Twitnling case should not
now be diluted, even unwittingly, either in its judicial philosophy or in its particulars. As
the surest way of keeping the Twining case intact, I would affirm this case on its au-
thority." 332 U.S. 46, 59-60.
105. The starting point of such an analysis might well be the classic discussion in 8
WIGMoaRE EvmEcE § 2251 (1940). After a careful marshaling of the arguments, Wig-
more comes to the conclusion that the privilege is justified, primarily because of the de-
leterious effect which its abolition would have on the administration of criminal justice.
"... any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to
compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must suffer morally thereby." [Emphasis in
original] Ibid.
If Wigmore's analysis is accepted, the status of the privilege as a constitutional guaran-
tee against state action may be questioned. If the thrust of the privilege is against low
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But instead, the majority satisfied itself with an answer to the Bill of
Rights contention and gave no more than cursory attention to the actual
problem of self-incrimination. It actually said no more than that a rule had
been laid down in Twining."'0
But the Adamson decision has at least cleared the air, and there is no
doubt that the Court will continue to use the traditional due process tech-
nique in its consideration of problems arising from state administration of
criminal justice. 107
Freed from the problem of choosing between competing techniques, the
Court can give its undivided attention to the problem of its function in the
relation between state and individual. The Adamson minority can turn its
defeat into a far more significant victory by exerting a continued pressure
for the inclusion of more broadly stated guarantees in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This is true particularly of Justices Rutledge and Murphy, whose
concern for personal freedom is not, like Justices Black's and Douglas's,
apparently mixed with a desire to impose effective limitations on the Court's
activity. 03
They should find that the due process technique is just as amenable to the
desired result as the mechanical rigidity of the Bill of Rights proposal. They
will not be able to commit future Courts to activism in civil rights and re-
straint in the economic sphere. Neither would the Black formula. It is not
in the nature of our constitutional process that any verbal formula should. 1 ,
There will always be an area of uncertainty and discretion. But while the
opportunity is at hand, the Court can build, at least for the near future, a
structure of comprehensive individual safeguards.
standards of administration rather than against unfair coercion of the individual on trial,
then it may have no place as a Fourteenth Amendment guarantee. See stpra p. 231.
Like the prevention of illegal action by police, the privilege may represent a desirable
policy, but not be so necessary to a fair trial as to require universalization by Supreme
Court fiat. That was Justice Cardozo's view. "This too might be lost, and justice still be
done." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
106. See Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the Court, 332 U.S. 46, 52-55.
107. The 1947-48 term of Court was crowded with state criminal procedure cases. See
the cases on coerced confessions, note 6S supra; right to counsel, notes 84-85 supra; and
jury exclusion, notes 87, 91 supra.
In addition, the Court had to consider two cases of first impression.
Michigan's one-man grand jury system was up for scrutiny in Re Oikver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948). But the secrecy of defendant's trial on a contempt charge afforded the Court an
opportunity to reverse without considering the constitutionality of the Michigan device.
The right to be notified of the charge against oneself wvas before the Court in Cole v.
Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Supreme Court of Arkansas, had affirmed Cole's con-
viction on a ground which Nwas neither specified in the indictment nor brought out at trial.
The Supreme Court's answer %was reversal of the conviction.
108. See note 18 supra.
109. ". . while unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative
branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own
exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." Stone, J., dissenting in U.S. y. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 78 (1935).
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